Disclaimer: Yes, I know that the Magic lost in the Finals. Stan Van Gundy and Dwight Howard deserve a lot of blame for that, but in truth, they just weren’t as good as the Lakers. They also weren’t as good as the Celtics or Cavs, but they still won because of their unique offense. I guess they got unlucky, or the Lakers were that much better than all of the teams that the Magic had conquered so far. Anyway, Because Orlando’s offense was so interesting and effective, I felt that it deserved to be studied, so here ya go. – Will
Every couple of years, every sport is faced with something that changes the game, and the way teams react to it will dictate how they will fare in the future. One of the primary game-changers in football was the Spread Offense. The Spread is employed when teams come out in the shotgun, mostly employing 3, 4, or 5 reciever sets. This offense allows for fluidity and many offensive options, and has served as the basis for some of the most influential and inventive offenses in football, Urban Meyer’s offenses at Utah and Florida that utilized the mobility and decision making of Alex Smith and Tim Tebow, Rich Rodriguez’s Spread Option at West Virginia, Hawaii’s offense that made Colt Brennan the most successful QB in the history of NCAA Football, Texas Tech’s “Air Raid” offense used to beat Texas this year, the Wildcat offense used by the Dolphins, and the now-defunct A-11 offense that you probably read a couple of articles about this year. The Spread Offense is (pardon the pun) spreading, and has to be recognized and planned for by defenses. Playing with the spread involves increasing a team’s overall speed, because they have to be able to take advantage of the vertical seams that are created in the defense. Defending the spread also requires increased speed, in order to fill these channels. Disparities in team speed can be disastrous for the slower team, as could be seen in the case of the 2007 BCS Championship Game, where the zippy Florida Gators trounced the hulking favorites, Ohio State, 41-14.
One may ask, when reading that first section, “What the hell does this have to do with the Orlando Magic, Will? How does a football offense relate to the offense the Magic employ?” Patience, dear reader. As a Celtics fan, I was hugely frustrated by the way Orlando played basketball. They didn’t attempt to duplicate the Celtic’s excellent ball movement, and Ray Allen’s amazing ability to come off screens, or Kendrick Perkins’ solid post moves. No, they were content to feed the ball to Dwight, have the defense collapse around him, and have him kick it out to an open Rashard Lewis/Hedo Turkoglu/Rafer Alston/Mickael Pietrus/Courtney Lee/J.J. Redick for an open three, which inevitably dropped in. Sure, Hedo and Lewis would occasionally hit midrange jumpers, and Pietrus would throw down a dunk or two, but most of the Magic’s O was built upon the three. On the inside, Perkins defended Howard fairly well, but oftentimes when Dwight didn’t get doubled he wouldn’t deal with the semantics of a skyhook, an up an under, or any other low post moves. He’d just dunk. However, his presence is even more important on the defensive end of the court, and he ran away with the blocks title and was a beast on the boards. Howard’s defensive domination allowed the Magic to play Rashard Lewis at 4 and Hedo Turkoglu at 3, who aren’t exactly Bill Walton and Scottie Pippen on the defensive end. ‘Shard and Turkoglu make up for their defensive uselessness by being great three point shooters.
As unique as this 4-out 1-in offensive system is to the NBA, it, like the spread offense, rose to the pros after being used successfully in college. It is a distant cousin of Memphis’s Dribble-Drive offense, which you can read about here. Pittsburgh and Villanova, who met in the Elite Eight this year, were probably the most well-known of those that used the 4-out 1-in, and they both used it very effectively. Pitt in particular had very similar personnel to the Magic, with a dominating inside presence, (Dejuan Blair) and a stable of solid perimeter shooters (Sam Young, Levance Fields, Brad Wanamaker, Jermaine Dixon, Ashton Gibbs.) Anyway, there are a few reasons I made the comparison between Orlando’s offense and football’s spread offense. One reason is that they are ostensibly similar, as they both spread out the defense and take advantage of the increased space. Another is that they have a similar etymology, coming up from the college ranks to be used in the pros. A third is that they both require very specific personnel. The spread requires speedy receivers, and a quarterback who can be both a field general and a mobile threat, a la Tebow, Brennan (sorta), and Graham Harrell. The Magic’s offense also requires 3 or 4 three point threats on the court at once, and a defensively dominating center who demands a double team. Because Orlando was so effective in the Conference Semis and Conference Finals with this offense, when I was thinking of ways to improve it, I couldn’t come up with any strategic improvements, but only better players to pull off the roles. So I decided to share my idea of what a perfect team running Orlando’s 4-out 1-in spread offense would look like. I have figured out everyone’s role and found a player who could play it better. Of course, I stayed under the Magic’s current salary, $68,713,618. I also tried to make it realistic, as there’s no way that you could have a team of all-stars, even if their salaries worked out. People would start bitching about playing time and fighting over groupies, and it would just be a mess. (I’m not including Jameer Nelson in this, as they played much better without him during the playoffs.)
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